Introduction

In In re Application of Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov, No. 25-1626-cv, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 9091 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2026), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing subpoenas issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1782. Claimant-Appellant Yulia Guryeva-Motlokhov sought discovery from two U.S. entities to assist her in foreign judicial proceedings in Antigua and Barbuda, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Second Circuit held that the district court properly denied the request, concluding that Guryeva-Motlokhov’s assertions regarding the intended use of the discovery were “too conclusory and speculative” to satisfy the statutory “for use” requirement.

The decision underscores the Second Circuit’s rigorous enforcement of section 1782’s statutory prerequisites, particularly the requirement that an applicant demonstrate a concrete and non-speculative intended use of the requested discovery in a foreign proceeding.​

Background

Guryeva-Motlokhov filed a section 1782 application in the Southern District of New York (Furman, J.) seeking discovery from two United States entities. She sought information concerning wire transfers dating to 2019 that referenced Gaston Browne, the prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, and several associated individuals and entities. Guryeva-Motlokhov sought the discovery for use in foreign proceedings in Antigua and Barbuda, Russia, and the UAE. The district court initially granted the ex parte application.

The Intervenors-Appellees subsequently moved to quash the subpoenas. In a June 4, 2025 order, the district court granted the motion, quashing the subpoenas and vacating its prior order. The district court concluded that Guryeva-Motlokhov had failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of section 1782 – specifically the “for use” requirement. Notably, the dismissal was “without prejudice,” leaving Guryeva-Motlokhov free to refile “in the event that circumstances change materially.” Guryeva-Motlokhov appealed.

Second Circuit affirms: “For use” was “entirely speculative”

On appeal, the Second Circuit conducted de novo review because the district court had resolved the application “solely on statutory grounds, and did not reach the discretionary factors” set forth in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). The court reiterated that section 1782 authorizes a district court to order a person within its jurisdiction to produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal” and that an applicant must satisfy three statutory requirements: (1) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district; (2) the requested material must be “for use” in a foreign proceeding; and (3) the application must be made by a foreign or international tribunal or any interested person.

As to the Antiguan proceedings, the court found Guryeva-Motlokhov’s claims speculative. Guryeva-Motlokhov did not assert an intention to use the requested discovery in her current proceedings before the Antiguan trial court, where a bench trial had already been completed, and she had no further opportunity to present evidence. Instead, she sought the discovery for potential use in a future appeal – either if she lost or if the opposing parties appealed a favorable judgment. The Second Circuit held that because the use of the discovery “depends on some intervening event[s] or decision[s],” Guryeva-Motlokhov had failed to identify a “procedural mechanism” by which she could “inject the discovery [she] seeks into foreign proceedings.”

The court was equally unpersuaded by Guryeva-Motlokhov’s argument that she would use the discovery in contemplated criminal proceedings in the UAE. Guryeva-Motlokhov’s own foreign law expert conceded that she was merely “considering initiating legal proceedings...pending the [r]equested [d]iscovery” and that UAE authorities would investigate her complaint only “[i]f the petition is deemed admissible.” The court concluded that Guryeva-Motlokhov’s “practical ability” to commence proceedings depended entirely on the outcome of the very discovery she sought and on the foreign prosecutor’s discretionary decision to initiate an investigation. This fell short of the “reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time” that the Second Circuit requires.

The court’s authority to quash subpoenas

Guryeva-Motlokhov also challenged the district court’s authority to quash the subpoenas, arguing that Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required a timely motion from all parties. The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Rule 45 does not deprive a district court of its “inherent authority to reconsider its interlocutory orders, particularly where those orders implicate the court’s statutory authority to order discovery.” Because the district court determined that the application did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites of section 1782, the court found no error in the decision to deny the discovery request in full.

Implications of the Guryeva-Motlokhov decision

The Second Circuit’s decision in Guryeva-Motlokhov makes clear that discovery requests premised on contingent future events – such as an appeal that might never be filed or a criminal investigation that might never be opened – are insufficient to satisfy the “for use” requirement. Applicants must demonstrate a concrete, non-speculative link between the requested discovery and an identifiable foreign proceeding.

For parties resisting section 1782 discovery, the decision confirms that courts will examine whether the statutory prerequisites are met before exercising their discretion. The ruling also reaffirms that district courts retain broad inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory orders granting section 1782 discovery, providing an important procedural avenue for challenging such orders even after they have been entered. Notably, the court’s “without prejudice” dismissal leaves the door open for renewed applications if circumstances materially change, underscoring that the denial was based on the current evidentiary record rather than any categorical bar.

Client Alert 2026-083