Key takeaways
- EC fines two food delivery companies €329 million for cartel in EU’s online food delivery sector by agreeing not to poach each other’s employees, exchanging commercially sensitive information and allocating markets
- Decision marks double first in EU antitrust enforcement: first to fine cartel in labour market and first to sanction abuse of minority stake
- EC started case on own initiative, relying on information from national authorities and own whistleblowing tool, confirming that it is actively monitoring markets (especially consumer-facing) for antitrust infringements
Background
On 2 June 2025, the European Commission (EC) fined two food delivery companies, Delivery Hero and Glovo, a total of €329 million for participating in a cartel from July 2018 to July 2022, during which Delivery Hero held only a non-controlling minority stake in Glovo. Delivery Hero acquired sole control of Glovo in July 2022.
Specifically, the EC found that the two companies progressively removed competitive constraints between them by agreeing:
- Not to poach each other’s employees. The shareholders’ agreement signed when Delivery Hero acquired a non-controlling minority stake in Glovo included limited reciprocal no-hire clauses for certain employees. This arrangement was later expanded into a broader agreement between the companies not to actively approach each other’s employees.
- To exchange commercially sensitive information. Exchanging commercially sensitive information – including on commercial strategies, prices, capacity, costs and product characteristics – enabled the companies to align and influence their respective market conduct.
- To allocate geographic markets. In particular, the two companies agreed to divide national markets for online food delivery in the EEA by (i) removing all existing geographic overlaps; (ii) avoiding entry into each other’s national markets; and (iii) coordinating which of them would enter markets where neither was yet present.
All these practices were facilitated by Delivery Hero’s minority shareholding in Glovo. In particular, the EC found that owning a non-controlling stake in Glovo enabled anti-competitive contacts between the two rival companies at several levels and allowed Delivery Hero to obtain access to commercially sensitive information and influence Glovo’s decision-making processes. Ultimately, this led to the alignment of the two companies’ respective business strategies.
Lessons learned and outlook
No-poach and other HR-related agreements can give rise to a cartel. Like other antitrust enforcers in Europe, the EC has long warned of the antitrust risks associated with no-poach and wage-fixing agreements. In two recent guidelines1 and its May 2024 “Antitrust in Labour Market” policy brief, the EC set out its general view that these types of HR-related agreements between competitors generally qualify as prohibited by-object restrictions of competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with only a very narrow scope for justification. The Delivery Hero/Glovo decision is the EC’s first fining decision against companies for a no-poach agreement, while another EC investigation into alleged no-poaching in the data centre construction sector is still ongoing.2 This decision also confirms a wider trend across Europe, with national competition authorities recently fining businesses for anti-competitive no-poach and wage-fixing practices across various sectors including in Belgium,3 France,4 Poland,5 Portugal6 and the UK.7
Holding a minority stake in a competing business can trigger antitrust liability. EU antitrust laws do not prevent companies from holding shareholdings in competitors. The EC’s decision does, however, send a clear warning to businesses and strategic investors that holding cross-directorships and shareholdings in competing businesses can raise significant antitrust risks where they facilitate collusion, including through the sharing of commercially sensitive information, and so should be managed carefully. Special attention must be paid in sectors with significant M&A activity, since EU and many national merger rules require investors to disclose to antitrust regulators any significant shareholdings of 10% or more, as well as any cross-directorships in competing businesses, when notifying transactions for merger clearance. Antitrust compliance and related safeguard measures must therefore be an integral part of investors’ portfolio management.
EC is actively monitoring markets (particularly consumer-facing ones) for potential intervention. This case was an ex officio investigation, highlighting the EC’s appetite to actively intervene in cartel cases on its own initiative, even in the absence of leniency applications, and to rely on information obtained through close cooperation with national competition authorities and its own anonymous whistleblowing tool. This trend is expected to continue, with Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera emphasising that, moving forward, the EC will “closely monitor potential anti-competitive business practices in consumer facing industries”.
- Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 259, 21 July 2023, pp. 1-125, para. 279; and Guidelines on the application of Union competition law to collective agreements regarding the working conditions of solo self-employed persons, OJ C 374, 30 September 2022, pp. 2-13, para. 17, example 2.
- On 18 November 2024, the EC issued a press release confirming unannounced antitrust inspections in the data centre construction sector.
- See the Belgian competition authority’s press release dated 3 July 2024, titled “The Belgian Competition Authority fines Securitas, G4S and Seris over 47 million euros to sanction their participation in a complex cartel scheme in the private security sector”.
- On 11 June 2025, the French competition authority announced that it fined four companies for no-poach practices in the engineering, technology consulting and IT services sectors.
- On 8 July 2024, the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) announced in a press release that it was investigating no-poach agreements in the retail and related logistics sector. In 2022, UOKiK had already fined the country’s top men’s basketball league and 16 clubs for illegally colluding to terminate players’ contracts and withhold their wages in response to the coronavirus pandemic (“Poland issues first no-poach infringement decision”, Global Competition Review, 24 October 2022).
- In February 2025, the Portuguese competition authority issued its third decision in recent years finding illegal no-poaching, highlighting that enforcement against restrictive labour market practices remains a top priority for 2025.
- See the Competition and Markets Authority’s non-confidential version of the infringement decision dated 21 March 2025, titled “Anti-competitive behaviour relating to freelance labour in the production and broadcasting of sports content”.
Client Alert 2025-165