DOJ pays first-ever antitrust whistleblower award

The program moves from untested to success

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) launched the Whistleblower Rewards Program on July 8, 2025, in partnership with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and the USPS Office of Inspector General. The program allows individuals to receive 15–30% of recovered funds when they voluntarily provide original information about a criminal antitrust violation affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or its property, so long as the matter results in at least $1 million in criminal fines or other recoveries.

On January 29, 2026, the Antitrust Division made its first payment – $1 million – to a whistleblower whose information led to criminal antitrust and fraud charges, a fine exceeding $3 million, and a deferred prosecution agreement. The resolution is also notable because the acquiring company was held liable for misconduct committed by legacy employees of an acquired entity, reinforcing the reality of successor liability in the antitrust context.

The award marks a clear step toward whistleblower-driven criminal antitrust enforcement. DOJ is increasingly adopting an incentives-based model similar to the False Claims Act, which continues to generate record filings and over $1.5 billion in relator awards in 2025 alone.

How the program differs from the leniency framework

For decades, the Antitrust Division’s primary detection mechanism has been the Leniency Program. That framework offers full immunity - or, in some cases, reduced penalties - to the first qualifying applicant who self-reports and cooperates fully. It is structured around strict eligibility requirements, including prompt reporting, cessation of the conduct, full cooperation, and, for corporations, restitution where appropriate. In practice, the program has largely been used by corporate entities rather than individual employees.  Moreover, the Leniency Program may be less effective than it once was, in part because of the perceived risk that self-reporting will not adequately shield companies that receive conditional leniency from having to make onerous payments to settle follow-on civil claims. The Whistleblower Rewards Program introduces an affirmative monetary incentive for individuals, including those who are outside the organization entirely, that could bolster the DOJ’s criminal antitrust enforcement program.

Broad reach: successor liability and enforcement implications

The Whistleblower Rewards Program has wide-ranging implications across industries. It covers criminal violations under the Sherman Act; related federal offenses used to facilitate or conceal antitrust misconduct; crimes affecting public procurement at the federal, state, or local level; and conduct that interferes with competition investigations or proceedings. The program heightens risk in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), as acquirers can face successor liability for antitrust violations committed by legacy employees of acquired companies.

Preparing for whistleblower-driven enforcement

Companies that face elevated antitrust risk – including those in industries characterized by competitive bidding, concentrated markets, or frequent competitor communications – are particularly vulnerable under the Whistleblower Rewards Program. This includes companies engaged in public procurement, as well as those in sectors where price-fixing, market allocation, bid rigging, or other forms of criminal antitrust conduct are prevalent enforcement risks. The first award demonstrates that companies in these sectors should move beyond high-level compliance statements and implement pre-acquisition diligence and post-acquisition compliance and auditing controls that reflect how whistleblower-driven cases actually arise and progress.

• Companies concerned about enforcement should encourage employees to raise potential misconduct internally while taking care not to adopt any policy or practice that could reasonably be viewed as discouraging or impeding an individual from contacting law enforcement or other government authorities. Any internal reporting program should therefore be framed as a voluntary, employee-supportive option – not a prerequisite to, or substitute for, external reporting – and should avoid language that could be construed as restricting protected whistleblower activity. To be effective and defensible, internal mechanisms must be credible, independent, and fast: anonymous hotlines should be administered by a qualified third party, permit the submission of supporting materials (e.g., bid files, emails, and text messages), and route complaints directly to legal or compliance leadership without operational filtering. Written service-level expectations – for example, triage within 48 hours and a determination on whether to open a privileged investigation within five business days – should be established and consistently followed, with contemporaneous documentation of each step. Finally, non-retaliation policies should be actively enforced and include monitoring for subtle forms of adverse action, such as role reassignment, diminished responsibilities, or exclusion from bid teams, with prompt remediation where concerns are identified.
• Organizations should also have a standing antitrust rapid-response protocol, including pre-drafted legal hold templates, a designated investigation team (inside counsel, outside antitrust counsel, and forensic support), and targeted custodian interview plans for high-risk functions. A pre-approved leniency decision framework should define thresholds for escalating issues to senior leadership or the board and guide coordination with potential fraud or procurement exposure.
• Antitrust risk should be integrated into M&A diligence. Review bid histories, competitor overlap, and communications involving pricing or capacity. Key personnel should provide written certifications, and post-closing, companies should implement day-one training, communication firewalls, and periodic audits to mitigate successor liability.
• Training should be role-specific and scenario-based, focusing on sales and bidding, with written acknowledgments and periodic refreshers. Data-driven monitoring should flag repeated bid patterns, price uniformity, or unusual competitor behavior, with documented follow-up.
• Third-party risk should be managed through antitrust representations, audit rights, training, and clear contractual consequences for subcontractors, joint venture partners, and agents.

Together, these measures transform antitrust compliance from a policy framework into an operational system designed to detect issues internally, respond under privilege, and make timely decisions about remediation or cooperation.

Enforcement in the context of DOJ departures

Recent departures of senior Antitrust Division personnel have raised questions about whether enforcement actions will slow or change direction, and in the near term, staffing transitions can affect resource allocation. However, several structural features point to continuity rather than contraction. The Whistleblower Rewards Program is embedded in interagency coordination and, therefore, is less dependent on any particular leadership cohort. Financial incentives for insiders decentralize detection, and the first award’s combination of antitrust and fraud charges draws on established investigative infrastructure. In practical terms, companies should plan for steady – or potentially increased – investigative activity even if case mix, legal theories, or industry focus evolve during the leadership transition.

Conclusion

The DOJ’s first-ever award under the Whistleblower Rewards Program underscores a clear shift toward whistleblower-driven enforcement in the antitrust space. The program exposes companies across industries – including those involved in mergers, acquisitions, and public procurement – to heightened scrutiny and potential liability. Successor liability and procurement-related violations are now front and center, making proactive compliance, rigorous due diligence, and robust reporting channels more critical than ever.

Companies that invest in strong compliance programs, targeted training, internal controls, and clear investigation protocols will be better positioned to identify and remediate risks before they escalate. As DOJ continues to leverage whistleblower incentives, organizations should treat these developments not as a theoretical risk but as a practical call to action to strengthen antitrust compliance programs, mitigate exposure, and ensure readiness for potential reporting or enforcement scenarios.

Our team is closely monitoring these developments and the evolving enforcement landscape, including the Whistleblower Rewards Program, successor liability trends, and related antitrust investigations.

Client Alert 2026-036