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Biotech in the crossfire: Proposed U.S. investment ban and China export rules reshape China-linked biopharma deals

Cross-border biopharma dealmaking has had a busy few weeks. Within days of each other in October 2026, Washington and Beijing each proposed rules that go to the heart of how China-origin drug assets are licensed, financed, and owned. On October 22, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) proposed rules under the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security (COINS) Act that would, for the first time, bring biotechnology into the Outbound Investment Security Program (OISP), and as a prohibited sector rather than a notifiable one. Six days earlier, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Science and Technology issued Announcement No. 48, which proposes export controls on 40 technologies, including cell and gene therapy (CGT) and small interfering RNA (siRNA) platforms, and imposes a pre-export registration requirement that already applies.

The bottom line. Ordinary product licensing of China-origin drug assets largely survives under both regimes. The real regulatory risk now lies in deals involving equity, warrants, NewCos, joint ventures, or platform technology, and the window to restructure, close, or comment on those deals is open now.

1. Why this matters now

China has become one of the most important sources of innovative drug assets for global pharma. According to PharmCube data reported by Reuters Breakingviews, China-based drugmakers signed $139.4 billion of overseas licensing deals between January 1 and October 8, 2026, already more than the $138.8 billion signed in all of 2025. As the market has matured, Chinese licensors have increasingly asked for equity stakes, warrants, and NewCo arrangements on top of upfront and milestone payments. Those equity-linked features are exactly what the new rules target.

Treasury has also shown that it is prepared to enforce these controls within existing sectors. On October 7, 2026, it announced its first OISP civil penalty: a $200,000 fine against Amidi, LLC for failing to notify an investment made by its foreign subsidiary in a Chinese embodied AI company.

2. The U.S. proposal: Biotech becomes a prohibited sector

Today’s program rests on a 2023 Executive Order and Treasury’s Part 850 rules, which cover semiconductors, quantum, and AI in China, Hong Kong, and Macau. The COINS Act, enacted in December 2025, puts the program on a statutory footing that will be much harder for a future administration to reverse. Congress required Treasury to add two new sectors—high-performance computing and hypersonics—and Treasury chose to add biotechnology on its own authority.

In our view, the structure is familiar, but the reach is new. A program originally built around U.S. venture capital (VC) flowing into Chinese tech start-ups would now touch mainstream pharmaceutical R&D, relationships with contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs) and contract research organizations (CROs), and laboratory automation.

The biotech ban: Who and which deals are covered

The provision that matters most for life sciences bans investment in companies that use a biological system to produce or modify pharmaceutical compounds. The text expressly lists small molecules, vaccines, cell and gene therapies, and antibodies. Read literally, that could reach much of China’s biopharma, CDMO, and CRO sector, not just frontier biotech. Treasury itself has asked whether the scope should be narrowed, which we read as a clear signal that this is the part of the rule most likely to change in response to comments. Three further points shape which companies may be affected.

  • Offshore incorporation is not a shield. A NewCo incorporated in Delaware or the Cayman Islands can still be a covered company if Chinese founders or licensors hold 50% or more of it or can direct or control it, including through contract or veto rights.
  • Tools and platforms are swept in. Sequencing, bioinformatics, proteomics, drug discovery, and lab automation businesses may find themselves covered even though they would not normally describe themselves as “biotech.”
  • Watch the U.S. lists. A deal that would otherwise only need to be notified becomes prohibited if the target or any of its affiliates appears on specified U.S. lists, such as the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies list or the forthcoming BIOSECURE Act list. In practice, one listed group member can taint dealings with the entire corporate family, so screening needs to cover the whole group, not just the contracting entity.

Turning to the deals themselves, the rule reaches investments, not licenses as such, so a straightforward cash license with upfront, milestone, and royalty payments generally falls outside it. The risk lies in the features that are often attached to those licenses. Assuming a Chinese counterparty that is a covered company, our read of the main deal features is as follows.

  • Equity in the Chinese licensor. Buying shares, warrants, or notes of the licensor after the effective date is the clearest prohibited activity, unless the shares are listed and carry no governance rights beyond standard minority protections. Each milestone-triggered share purchase is tested at its own closing.
  • Joint ventures and NewCos. Treasury applies a plain-meaning test, under which a joint venture exists where the parties contribute capital or assets and share profits and losses. No new entity is needed, and location does not matter. A license paired with licensee equity issued to the licensor, a NewCo co-formed with the licensor, or a 50/50 co-development and profit-share deal may therefore be a prohibited joint venture. We would treat NewCos with a Chinese licensor as the highest-risk structure.
  • What should still work. Where the parties want to collaborate, cost reimbursement plus royalties is a safer model than a profit-and-loss split. Joint steering committees are likely acceptable if the licensee keeps the final say in its territory. Buying chemistry, manufacturing, and controls (CMC), supply, or CRO services from a Chinese partner is a procurement contract and is not covered, but funding a new plant or program of your own in China is likely a prohibited greenfield investment.
  • Timing and evasion. The rule is not retroactive, but deals and equity tranches that close after the effective date are covered. Structures designed to evade the rule are themselves covered.
  • What to watch. The pending Biotech Investment National Security Act would extend the regime to licensing itself. Treasury’s brief explanation for adding biotechnology may also leave a broad final rule open to legal challenge.

AI and biotech at a glance

Sector

Prohibited (proposed)

Notifiable (proposed)

Change vs. Part 850

Super intelligence (SI) systems (formerly AI)

Investment in a covered foreign person that develops any SI system, including generative, agentic, and embodied SI (robotics, autonomous vehicles, unmanned systems)

None (notification tier eliminated)

Compute and end-use thresholds removed. Enhancing or extending a third-party model for commercial use counts as development, but internal, non-commercial use does not

Biotechnology (new)

Use of biological systems to produce pharmaceutical compounds, agents and toxins, functional materials, biofuels, brain-computer interfaces, certain biomanufacturing equipment, sequencing, advanced flow cytometry and LC-MS proteomics, bioinformatics, lab automation, and cloud labs

None (prohibited only)

Entirely new; discretionary addition

AI: Relevant to AI-enabled drug discovery

Today, only certain high-end AI investments are banned, while others simply need to be notified. The proposal would remove that distinction and ban investment in any covered company that develops any SI system. Enhancing or extending a third-party model for commercial use would count as development, but internal, non-commercial use, including fine-tuning for internal purposes, would not. For any China-linked target, the practical question therefore becomes whether it “develops” or merely “uses” AI, and answering it will take careful technical diligence.

Who is a “covered foreign person” now?

  • Direction or control. A company that is directed or controlled by a Chinese person would be covered, regardless of the size of the stake. That means even a minority Chinese investor with a board seat or veto rights may now need to be analyzed.
  • Where management sits. A U.S.-incorporated company could be covered if, for example, its CEO runs the business from China.
  • Existing tests carry over. The 50% ownership test remains, as does the test that looks at whether more than 50% of a company’s revenue, income, capital expenditure (capex), or operating expenditure is attributable to covered activities.
  • More countries. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and, in principle, Venezuela would be added. Given the sanctions already in place, however, China and Hong Kong remain the practical focus.
  • No government list. Treasury will not publish a list of covered companies, so the burden of a reasonable and diligent inquiry stays with the investor.

Transactions, exceptions, and funds

  • Covered deals. The familiar categories remain: equity, certain convertible debt, joint ventures, greenfield and brownfield investments, and certain fund investments.
  • U.S. executives abroad. U.S.-person officers and directors who sit on the boards of non-U.S. companies and funds will need recusal protocols that cover notifiable deals, not just prohibited ones.
  • Exceptions. The proposal adds new exceptions for a $50,000 de minimis amount (which applies to notification only), underwriting, bank lending, and payment processing. Existing exceptions, such as those for publicly traded securities and pre-existing binding commitments, remain in place.
  • Funds. The limited partner (LP) exception still applies to commitments of $2 million or less, or where the investor has a binding side-letter assurance. Investing in a fund that already holds covered assets, including through a secondary purchase, may itself be covered, however.
  • Funding China subsidiaries. Treasury has asked how broadly it should read the exception for U.S. parents that “maintain operations” in China. The answer will matter a great deal to multinationals planning capex for their China businesses.

Process and penalties

  • Knowledge. Investors will be held responsible for what they know, what they have reason to know, and what a reasonable and diligent inquiry would have revealed. Contractual representations help but are not a safe harbor.
  • Notifications. Notifiable deals must still be reported to Treasury within 30 days after closing.
  • Treasury feedback. A new, narrow, and non-binding process will allow parties to ask Treasury whether a specific deal is prohibited. National interest exemptions also remain available.
  • Penalties. Violations can lead to civil penalties of up to the greater of $250,000 (inflation-adjusted) or twice the value of the transaction, as well as forced divestment. Voluntary self-disclosure is a mitigating factor, but it must now include a mitigation proposal, which may involve divestment.

3. The China proposal: Announcement No. 48 and biopharma technology

China proposes adding 40 technologies to its export control catalog, made up of 23 in AI, five in biopharmaceuticals, and 12 in photovoltaics. The catalog changes are not yet in force, but the registration requirement is. On the biopharma side, the scope is relatively narrow, as the table below shows.

Technology

Proposed control

Practical effect

CGT and siRNA technology platforms

Prohibited

Only transfers of ownership are barred. Out-licensing and outsourced R&D or manufacturing fall outside the prohibition, and single-product technologies are not treated as platforms

CGT and siRNA novel target discovery and validation

Restricted (license required)

Automatic licensing for out-licensing and co-development

Artificial genetic modification and enhancement of pathogenic microorganisms

Prohibited

Largely unrelated to commercial deals

Register now. Until the new catalog takes effect, exporters must register with MOFCOM before they transfer ownership of covered technology abroad, license it for use overseas, or allow a foreign entity to become its owner or controller. The requirement also covers exports that were already underway on October 16. Some of the procedural details are still unclear, so deal teams should build registration into their timetables and closing conditions rather than treat it as a formality.

4. Impact on biopharma deal structures

Structure

 U.S. risk

China risk

Pure product in-licensing

Low (technology-transfer terms warrant review)

Low, but registration is needed if CGT or siRNA technology is in scope

License plus equity or warrants

High, as the equity component may be prohibited

Registration if in scope

NewCo funded by U.S. investors

High, given the ownership, control, and financial-metrics tests

Registration required, and assignment of a platform is prohibited

Co-development/profit sharing

Medium, as the arrangement may be treated as a “joint venture”

Automatic licensing for target technology

China JVs or new PRC facilities (as distinct from buying CDMO/CRO services, which is low risk)

High, as a new China facility or program is likely a prohibited greenfield investment

Outsourced manufacturing permitted

Hong Kong-listed biotech shares

Low, given the publicly traded securities exception, provided there are no governance rights beyond standard minority protections

Not applicable

These carve-outs are proposals rather than settled safe harbors, and either side may change them in its final rules.

5. What to do now

Who

Priority actions

Biopharma and life sciences companies

Take stock of China-origin licensing, NewCo, co-development, and CDMO arrangements, and assess whether any counterparty is under Chinese “direction or control.” Screen the whole corporate group against the 1260H and BIOSECURE lists. Expect p

Chinese licensors

Classify CGT/siRNA technology as platform, target discovery, or single-product, and register in-scope deals with MOFCOM now, including deals underway.

Multinationals with China operations

Test China capex plans against different readings of the “maintain operations” exception. Review where senior executives are based and update recusal protocols for U.S.-person officers of foreign affiliates.

LPs, fund-of-funds, and secondary buyers

Ask for binding side-letter assurances and look closely at funds’ existing portfolios. Commitments above $2 million deserve a second look, and China-exposed secondaries should be approached with care.

VC, PE, and growth investors

Map deals that touch China-linked AI, robotics, biotech, tools, semiconductors, or hypersonics, and consider accelerating any that would become prohibited. Keep a clear record of diligence, and build COINS representations, covenants, and exit rights into deal documents.

Banks and underwriters

Confirm that the new underwriting, lending, and ancillary-services exceptions cover current activities, and refine policies on temporary acquisitions.

All stakeholders

Build an updated compliance program that covers screening, diligence records, a 30-day notification workflow, and a self-disclosure protocol.

6. Where comments could make a difference

  • Narrowing the biotech ban so that it targets advanced or frontier technologies rather than ordinary drug development.
  • Restoring a notification tier or objective thresholds for AI, and drawing a clearer line between “developing” and “using” AI.
  • Creating clear safe harbors under the “direction or control” test, for example, for minority stakes that carry no veto or board control.
  • Excluding fund and secondary investments where no new capital actually reaches a covered company.
  • Reading the “maintain operations” exception broadly enough to allow continued funding of existing China subsidiaries.
  • On the China side, clarifying how registration works in practice and where the line falls between platform and single-product technologies.

Questions for the board

  • Do we know which current and planned licenses, NewCos, co-development, CDMO and CRO arrangements, JVs, and fund commitments have a China nexus in biotech, AI, or other covered sectors?
  • Could any of those deals be restructured, for example, by working with collaborators outside China?  
  • Should any of those deals be accelerated, restructured, or put on hold before the final rules take effect?
  • How would the rules affect our plans to fund our China subsidiaries?
  • Is our compliance program ready for the new rules, and is it worth filing comments, directly or through an industry association, by December 7?

Looking ahead

Neither rule is final, and both comment periods are a genuine opportunity to shape the outcome. Treasury has gone out of its way to invite input on narrowing the biotech scope, and comments that use concrete examples of how the rule would affect clinical development or patient access are likely to carry the most weight. In the meantime, life sciences companies and investors with active China pipelines should review live deals now rather than wait for the final rules. Reed Smith’s cross-border team can help assess specific transactions and prepare submissions.

Client Alert 2026-213

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