An in-house lawyer once bemoaned to us how his outside lawyers were constantly bragging about their trial chops, when the overwhelming majority of cases end in settlement. To be sure, a demonstrated ability and willingness to proceed to trial is a huge aid to garnering a favorable settlement, but there is much more to the resolution process than sword-brandishing. The intricacies of mass tort settlements are particularly daunting, and there are not a whole lot of lawyers out there who have mastered them.
That brings us to today’s case, In re East Palestine Train Derailment, 2026 WL 3409373 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2026), a published affirmance of settlement-based preclusion of future litigation in non-prescription medical product litigation. It helps that the decision was authored by the brilliant Judge Thapar. Most of this Sixth Circuit decision is not relevant to what we do, but one part is, and it pertains to a settlement issue that is very important in mass torts. We will lob in our own thoughts on the decision, but it is not possible to improve upon Judge Thapar’s opening paragraph:
“Compromise requires give and take. That’s true of the hard-fought settlement East Palestine residents reached with Norfolk Southern after a train filled with hazardous chemicals derailed in their town. That settlement entitled every resident to direct payments from Norfolk Southern. Many residents also chose to take an extra payment. In return for that payment, they gave Norfolk Southern a concession; they wouldn’t sue over personal injuries. Thanks to the settlement, the victims started receiving payments. Yet now, a few residents want their right to sue back. So they asked the district court for relief from the settlement. The district court saw no basis for that extraordinary relief, and neither do we.”
As you would expect, the settlement had been approved by the district court after a fairness hearing. And yet this recent case was not the first time that some East Palestine plaintiffs tried to undo their settlement. By this point, the virtue of finality probably seemed quite plain to the district court and the Sixth Circuit. In this iteration, 196 residents (a very small percentage of the class of nearly a half a million members) wanted out of their settlement of train wreck claims in order to pursue late personal injury claims. They claimed, among other things, that their agreement to settle was fraudulently obtained.
What frauds? The plaintiffs alleged several frauds. Of interest here is that the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant failed to disclose the specific terms of the settlement termination agreement. That “provision says that [defendant] may terminate the settlement if class members’ opt-out rates trigger certain thresholds.” This type of provision is common to many, probably most, mass tort settlements, including those in prescription medical product liability litigation. No defendant wants to pay huge sums to settle a litigation and then still have to face a series of high stakes trials. (Early in our career, we were brought in to try several cases after a badly crafted settlement permitted the plaintiff lawyers to opt out their best cases and drag the defendant into many brutal trials in a difficult forum. Good times.) A defendant wants to buy peace, not a parade of piecemeal payoffs to the titans of the plaintiffs bar.
The plaintiffs sought relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. For alleged frauds by their own class counsel, 60(d)(3) controlled. For alleged frauds by the defendant, which is what we are focusing on here, 60(b)(3) controlled. To set aside the judgment under that provision, the plaintiffs needed to show by clear and convincing evidence that an opposing party misrepresented a material fact or concealed one despite a “duty to disclose,” inducing the movants to their detriment.
The settlement termination provision in the East Palestine case did not specify the percentage of plaintiffs that had to agree to participate, and the plaintiffs asserted that that number was improperly hidden from them. The court rejected this argument. The existence of the provision was “highlighted” in the publicly available settlement document. The public settlement agreement cross-referenced a Supplemental Termination Agreement. The Supplemental Agreement was private, but its existence was not hidden. Indeed, its existence was “highlighted.” The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “when class members agreed to the settlement, they knew it included those undisclosed terms.” The defendant had no duty to disclose such details to class members. And here, the Sixth Circuit engaged in some necessary litigation realism (reminding us of Judge Posner, who, sadly, left us just a few days ago): “It’s common for class-action settlements to include provisions allowing defendants to end the deal if too few class members participate,” and “the threshold number of opt outs required to trigger those provisions is typically not disclosed.” There are good reasons to keep that number confidential to prevent third parties from disrupting settlements. Thus, the defendant “had no duty to diverge from that well-trodden path” and the non-disclosure of the termination threshold did not permit the plaintiffs’ attack on the settlement terms.
This case appears to be the first published appellate decision anywhere on this issue, so it is of interest to our audience, and should supply additional guidance and confidence when drafting the settlement termination provision.