Companies must continue to remain diligent when adapting their pricing strategy in the current regulatory environment, particularly given the risk of a second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.
This alert outlines the global enforcement trends in relation to excessive pricing and price gouging, explains the relevant key rules and provides practical guidance to businesses on how to avoid potential enforcement risks and the basic steps in response to sudden and significant price increases by a supplier.
Our forthcoming Global Antitrust and Competition Guide provides more detailed guidance on the relevant price gouging regulations for key jurisdictions (EU, France, Germany, the UK, US and China). For queries or further information, please contact any of the authors to this alert or anyone from the Reed Smith Antitrust and Competition Team.
Practical implications for businesses
- Businesses with market power in the EU and other jurisdictions that prohibit excessive prices under antitrust rules and all businesses (irrespective of market power) in jurisdictions with specific price gouging laws, like the United States and China, must carefully assess any significant increases to their pre-crisis pricing. This applies, in particular, to businesses active in sensitive sectors, such as health care products, medical equipment and food.
- There may be valid, objective, and lawful reasons to increase prices even in times of COVID-19 (unless products are subject to regulated price caps). This can be as a result of increases in input costs (due to supply chain disruptions) and/or production costs (due to sudden expansion of production/capacity).
- To mitigate risk, companies should use objective criteria for pricing their products (in particular, products that are considered scarce in the current COVID-19 crisis), document the legitimate business reasons for the price increases, and explain the objective need for price increases in external customer communications. In case of doubt, they should consult their legal counsel in the first instance.
- Where businesses are exposed to sudden price increases (and commercial negotiations are no longer feasible), recourse may be sought before antitrust or other competent authorities and/or courts for injunctive relief and/or damages.
Important reminder: Any agreement with competitors to fix prices (or pricing components), allocate customers, and/or the exchange of related information is strictly prohibited and tends to result in heavy fines. In some jurisdictions, such as the EU, stricter antitrust rules apply that prohibit suppliers from fixing their distributors’ resale prices or setting minimum resale prices. These rules generally apply regardless of the level of the price or the parties’ market position. Violations of antitrust rules are also likely to trigger private damages claims, which can include treble damages, attorneys’ fees and no right to contribution in certain jurisdictions, such as the United States.
Significant enforcement across the globe
Since the outbreak of COVID-19, governments across the globe have been actively monitoring the market and investigating businesses for charging excessive or unfair prices, based on antitrust, consumer protection and price gouging prohibitions.
In Europe, the European Commission (EC) and the member states’ national competition authorities have highlighted excessive pricing as a major area of concern in the context of COVID-19: “It is of utmost importance to ensure that products considered essential to protect the health of consumers in the current situation (e.g. face masks and sanitizing gel) remain available at competitive prices.”1 EU Commissioner Vestager further emphasised that “a crisis is not a shield against competition law enforcement” and that the EC “will stay even more vigilant than in normal times if there is a risk of virus-profiteering”. This sentiment has been echoed by many national competition authorities.
On 18 June 2020, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) launched investigations against four pharmacies and convenience stores for alleged excessive pricing of hand sanitiser products.2 There have also been a number of antitrust investigations across the EU, including in Greece,3 Italy,4 Portugal5 and Spain.6 Antitrust regulators in Europe have increasingly pursued excessive pricing cases in recent years, and the COVID-19 crisis has again shown that authorities remain vigilant. This trend is likely to continue post-COVID-19. In addition, certain competition authorities in Europe (e.g., in the UK, Italy and Poland) also have powers to investigate violations of consumer protection laws and are making use of them in the COVID-19 crisis.
In the United States, price gouging laws are predominantly enforced at state level on the basis of specific price-gouging or more general consumer protection statutes. Many US state attorneys general issued warnings against price gouging and are more active than ever in monitoring prices and enforcing price gouging laws, including in New Jersey,7 New York8 and Michigan,9 and lawsuits are pending before U.S. courts. At the federal level, President Trump signed an executive order10 in March 2020 aimed at preventing price gouging and the hoarding of crucial medical supplies needed to fight COVID-19. The Department of Justice (DOJ) is also prioritising fraudulent activity and price gouging involving vital supplies needed to fight COVID-19.11 Similar enforcement trends can be observed across the Americas, including in Canada12 and Brazil.13
Excessive pricing and price gouging have also been subject to scrutiny by regulators across Asia. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the government has issued various notices and regulations on price gouging in response to the COVID-19 outbreak and launched a number of investigations into price gouging behaviour. In the peak period between February and March 2020 alone, about 14,000 cases of illegal price hikes of coronavirus-related materials were filed for investigation, among which more than 7,900 cases were verified and relevant business operators punished. Authorities in the wider region, including in Taiwan14 and Indonesia,15 have also taken action against price gouging and excessive pricing.
Antitrust rules prohibiting customer exploitation
Excessive pricing as abuse of dominance
Competition laws in the EU and many other countries prohibit dominant companies from charging excessive prices. Excessive pricing only runs afoul of these competition laws where, first, a company is dominant in the relevant market; and, second, the company abuses this position (i.e., having dominance as such is not prohibited) by charging excessive prices and/or imposing other unfair trading conditions. In some jurisdictions (such as Germany16), the abuse of dominance rules may be even stricter. By contrast, in the United States, excessive prices are not in themselves prohibited by antitrust laws, but nearly all states have laws in place that prohibit businesses from price gouging.
Dominance
Courts have generally defined dominance as a position of economic strength that confers on a company “the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of its consumers”. Whether a company has such power depends on the product and geographic scope of the relevant market and the competitive structure of this market – in particular, factors such as the market position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors, barriers to entry and/or expansion, customer switching and countervailing buyer power. Market shares provide a useful first indication when assessing dominance. By rule of thumb, a company is more likely to be dominant under EU rules if its market share exceeds 40 per cent.
Finding a company to be dominant can be complex and typically requires that it enjoys market power for a sustained period of time. However, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, where market dynamics change suddenly, traditional methods for assessing market power may not always reflect a company’s real market position. To address potentially abusive behaviour during the COVID-19 crisis, the competition authorities may apply the concept of dominance flexibly by:
- defining narrow markets to more easily find a company dominant;
- finding a company temporarily dominant. In the ABG Oil case (1977), for instance, the EC found that, during an oil shortage arising from the world oil crisis, oil companies were temporarily dominant since their customers were “completely dependent” on them for scarce products and the companies were unable to compete with each other due to the general supply shortage in the market;
- finding a company to be dominant jointly with other companies (collective dominance). This may be the case particularly in highly concentrated, oligopolistic markets where there are sufficient economic/structural links between the companies and they conduct themselves in the market in effect as a single entity even in the absence of any express agreement; or
- using the fact that a company can charge prices above the competitive level as an indicator of dominance itself. In its Article 102 TFEU Enforcement Priorities Paper, the EC considers a company dominant if it is capable of profitably increasing prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time (paragraph 11). In a recent decision in South Africa, the competition tribunal found a supplier of facemasks guilty of excessive pricing on the basis that it was capable of charging an excessive price independently of its competitors during the relevant period between 31 January and 5 March 2020.17
Excessive pricing (and other exploitative abuses)
Abuse of dominance rules only prohibit a company’s pricing practices if the prices charged are excessive. EU courts have found that a price is excessive if it has “no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supply”.18
To determine whether the price at stake is excessive, EU courts have applied the following two-stage test: first, the difference between the dominant company’s costs actually incurred and the price actually charged must be excessive; and, second, the imposed price must be either unfair in itself or when compared to the price of competing products. Alternatively, there may be other benchmarks to determine whether a price is unfair or not. Recently, for instance, EU courts found that (i) comparisons with prices in other member states may be appropriate provided that the reference countries are selected “in accordance with objective, appropriate and verifiable criteria and the comparisons are made on a consistent basis”; and (ii) excessive prices must be significant and persistent.19
Even if a dominant company’s pricing is found to be excessive, it does not constitute an illegal abuse if there is an objective justification for the price increase. This can, for instance, be the case if the price increase is caused by or reflects an increase in the dominant company’s costs (e.g., input costs due to supply chain disruptions, or costs related to sudden capacity/production expansion) or other market developments. The dominant company bears the burden of proof to substantiate an objective justification.
The fact that it may be difficult for antitrust regulators to determine whether a price is excessive has not prevented competition authorities in Europe from actively pursuing excessive pricing cases in recent years, in particular in the pharmaceutical and energy sectors. Given the significant impact the COVID-19 crisis has had and will continue to have on consumers, dominant companies will therefore need to be vigilant and be careful when re-adopting their pricing strategy in the context of COVID-19 (and its aftermath).
Finally, in the current crisis, dominant companies may not only consider changing their pricing but also other, non-price terms. To this extent, it is important to note that EU abuse of dominance rules not only prohibit dominant companies from exploiting customers by charging excessive prices, but also by imposing “other unfair trading conditions”. This includes all non-price terms by which a dominant company seeks to extract an unfair or disproportionate benefit from its trading partner.
Attention: strict rules against price fixing and information exchanges
Competition laws around the globe prohibit agreements between competitors on prices and/or related information exchanges, and violations are likely to result in high fines (which in the EU could, in principle, be up to 10 per cent of global turnover).
In some jurisdictions (like the EU), strict antitrust rules also apply to supply/distributor relationships which prohibit suppliers from fixing their distributors’ resale prices or setting minimum resale prices. Exceptions are only available in limited, narrow circumstances, and subject to prior legal review. In the context of resale pricing, for instance, setting maximum resale prices or recommended prices is generally low risk under EU competition law rules (unless the parties involved have market power).
Importantly, such pricing-related practices are generally prohibited regardless of the parties’ market position and the level of the price. Competition authorities have repeatedly emphasised that these rules continue to apply and to be enforced, even during the COVID-19 crisis.
Price gouging and consumer protection rules
In many jurisdictions, price gouging may be enforced through specific price gouging laws and/or general consumer protection rules. This is particularly relevant in jurisdictions like the United States where antitrust rules do not prohibit excessive pricing or price gouging. In other jurisdictions (e.g., China), these rules apply in parallel to the abuse of dominance rules. Today, over 30 competition authorities globally, including in the UK, Italy and Poland, are competent to enforce competition and consumer protection laws.20 Unlike excessive pricing under antitrust rules, price gouging rules and general consumer protection laws apply to all firms, regardless of market power.
Price gouging laws in the United States and China
In the United States, neither federal laws (with the exception of the Defense Production Act) nor antitrust laws prohibit price gouging. Instead, price gouging is governed by state law,21 and nearly all US states either have a law specifically prohibiting price gouging or have announced that they will enforce price gouging in the COVID-19 crisis based on general unfair trade practices and consumer protection laws.
There is, however, no uniform definition of price gouging under US state laws:
- Most states’ price gouging laws are triggered upon a state of emergency or abnormal market disruption.22 Currently, only Michigan and Ohio have price gouging laws in place that can be applied without a triggering event.23
- Most price gouging laws prohibit imposing “unconscionable” or “excessive” prices24 or “unconscionable” or “excessive” price increases.25 The definitions of ‘unconscionable’ and ‘excessive’ vary among states. Some price gouging laws provide that it is prima facie evidence of an unconscionable price if the price increased by more than 25 per cent, as compared to the average price of the same or similar commodity during the last 30 days26 immediately prior to the triggering event.27 Some states provide a specific percentage increase, which ranges from 10 per cent to 25 per cent.28 Other states measure by profit increase rather than price increase,29 while others again consider a price to be unconscionable if the crisis price “grossly”30 or “substantially”31 exceeds the pre-crisis price.
- State laws also vary with regard to what products and services are covered by their respective price gouging laws. Some price gouging laws apply to the sale of any commodity,32 others are limited to emergency supplies,33 essential commodities34 or specified items,35 while others apply only to drugs36 or fuel/petroleum.37
Price gouging laws generally do not prohibit natural price increases. Some states permit price increases if they are attributable to reasonable costs incurred in connection with the sale of goods or services,38 or additional operating expenses incurred by the seller because of the emergency or disaster.39 Other states permit price increases if the fluctuations in price occur during the normal course of business40 or if the price increased “in an amount which accurately reflects an increase in cost of the goods or services to the person selling the goods or services or an increase in the cost of transporting the goods or services into the area.”41
Violations can lead to monetary penalties, and some states impose criminal penalties. In addition to civil and criminal penalties, the statutes often provide for injunctive relief, and the recovery of damages, costs of investigations, and reasonable attorney’s fees. Some states allow private causes of action for those harmed by the price gouging, to recover damages (sometimes even treble damages, costs and attorney’s fees).
In China, price gouging is generally regulated by the PRC Price Law (though it can also violate antitrust rules on excessive pricing and unfair trade practices and consumer protection rules). The PRC Price Law gives the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) wide powers to supervise and inspect the prices of goods and services and to investigate unfair pricing behaviours, including using misleading or false pricing practices, covertly manipulating prices by raising or reducing grade levels of goods and services, and illegally seeking exorbitant profits (even absent market power).
Despite existing price gouging laws, Chinese regulators introduced reinforcing countermeasures to address the COVID-19 outbreak. In February 2020, SAMR issued additional guidance on the application of the PRC Price Law and specified price gouging violations of epidemic-prevention products (including masks, antiviral medicines, disinfection and sterilisation products, as well as other relevant medical devices and equipment) and daily necessities (such as rice, oil, meat, eggs, milk and vegetables).
The SAMR guidance provides examples of practices that may constitute illegal price gouging, including:
- selling the same product in such a manner that it results in the margin between the seller’s costs and sales price being significantly higher than that of the last actual transaction on or before 19 January 2020; or
- otherwise selling at a margin above levels determined as acceptable by the local counterparts of SAMR. Although the national government has not issued further guidance on what prices can be considered ‘excessive’, local governments have set thresholds ranging between 15 per cent (e.g., Hubai, Hainan, Qinghai and Gansu provinces) and 35 per cent (Shandong and Guizhou provinces). Any violation of the price gouging laws may result in administrative fines or even criminal penalties depending on the character and severity of the conduct.
Similar to the United States, the PRC Price Law requires business operators to set prices based on the costs of manufacturing, operation and market supply and demand. Generally reasonable price increases due to cost increases or changes in the market are therefore not prohibited under Chinese price gouging rules.
Consumer protection and unfair trade laws
Price gouging can also raise concerns under general consumer protection and unfair trade practice rules that protect consumers from unfair or misleading practices.Typically, such rules provide for a general duty “not to trade unfairly” and prohibit specific forms of misleading trade actions and omissions or aggressive practices.42 Although price gouging or excessive pricing is regularly not prohibited per se under consumer protection laws, combining aggressive and/or misleading selling techniques with excessive prices can give rise to violations. On 20 May 2020, for instance, the EC and national consumer protection authorities in the EU highlighted that it is a violation of EU consumer protection laws where “traders use pressure selling techniques or provide inaccurate information about market conditions or about the possibility of finding the product order to cause the consumer to pay higher than normal prices.”43
Violations can lead to injunctions (to terminate the conduct) and private damage claims before national courts. Some competition authorities in Europe, for example, in the UK, Italy and Poland, have also started investigating possible violations of consumer protection laws in the COVID-19 crisis. The issues raised relate to wholesalers’ termination of contracts in order to raise prices (Poland) and the charging of excessive prices or giving misleading information about the efficacy of protective equipment and personal health products by retailers (UK) and online platforms. Similarly, in the United States, some state attorneys general recently warned that they can prosecute businesses for price gouging under general consumer protection laws,44 while others have taken an opposite stance.45
Price regulation
Some governments have opted to introduce (emergency) price regulation for essential products in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Such pricing regulation is typically narrow in scope, applying only to essential products, and limited in duration, and violations can result in administrative fines for individuals and/or businesses. In France, for instance, the government introduced a (retail and wholesale) price cap for hand sanitisers and surgical masks, effective 12 May 2020, which will remain in force until 1 April 2021 (unless withdrawn before that date). Price caps were also introduced in Portugal (for protective equipment and alcohol-based sanitisers) and Australia (for essential products, including face masks, gloves, gowns and goggles, protective glasses and eye visors, alcohol wipes and hand sanitisers).46 In other jurisdictions, such as the UK, authorities have publicly announced that they are closely monitoring the price and market developments and have requested the government to introduce temporary legislation to tackle price gouging.
Concluding remarks
In the wake of COVID-19, regulators across the globe are actively investigating companies that increase their prices for potential price gouging, albeit the tools available to them may differ across jurisdictions, even within Europe. Businesses in sectors facing increased pressure due to the pandemic, in particular, must carefully assess any significant increases to their pre-crisis pricing. In jurisdictions (like the EU) where antitrust rules tackle price gouging, the potential abuse of a firm’s market power will be the prime concern. However, in jurisdictions with specific price gouging laws (like the US and China), the conduct of firms will be subject to scrutiny, irrespective of market power.
Price increases are generally lawful where they reflect increased costs (e.g., for input or production), unless products are subject to regulated price caps. To mitigate risk, companies should use objective, well-documented criteria for pricing their products, especially products that are considered scarce in the current COVID-19 crisis. Companies should also take extra time and pay special attention to documenting the rationale for price increases internally, and to explain the objective need for price increases in external customer communications. Where companies may be exposed to sudden price increases, they may have recourse to antitrust or other competent authorities and/or courts for injunctive relief, damages.
Given the ever-changing laws across various jurisdictions, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to potential price gouging, particularly in a post-first-wave COVID-19 world where some predict a second wave in the third and fourth quarters of 2020. If your company is thinking about raising prices or believes it may have been price gouged, you should seek legal advice immediately.
Our Reed Smith Coronavirus team includes multidisciplinary lawyers from Asia, EME and the United States who stand ready to advise you on the issues above or others you may face related to COVID-19.
For more information on the legal and business implications of COVID-19, visit the Reed Smith Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resource Center or contact us at COVID-19@reedsmith.com
- “Joint statement by the European Competition Network (ECN) on application of competition law during the Corona crisis” (23 March 2020).
- See www.gov.uk.
- See www.epant.gr (health care products); www.epant.gr (food).
- See en.agcm.it (food, detergents, disinfectants and gloves); www.agcm.it (COVID-19 antibody tests).
- See www.asae.gov.pt (PPE, medical products and hand sanitisers).
- See www.cnmc.es (funeral services, health care products).
- The New Division of Consumer Affairs issued more than 500 cease and desist letters and more than 85 subpoenas to businesses, available at morriscountynj.gov.
- New York Attorney General Letitia James issued hundreds of cease and desist notifications to businesses charging excessive prices for hand sanitisers, disinfectant sprays, and rubbing alcohol, available at ag.ny.gov.
- The Michigan Department of Attorney General received more than 800 COVID-19-related consumer complaints, which have led to many corresponding cease and desist letters, available at www.michigan.gov.
- Executive Order 13910.
- See DOJ’s policy to combat price gouging and hoarding, available at www.justice.gov.
- See www.rcinet.ca.
- See www.cade.gov.br.
- The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) has started investigating price fixing and price gouging during the outbreak in relation to essential groceries, including flour, biscuits, noodles and canned food, and, in January and March 2020, conducted dawn raids at major supermarkets as part of investigations into such practices.
- The Indonesian competition authority has increased scrutiny in a number of areas, with a particular focus on excessive pricing in the health care, medical equipment and food sectors.
- German antitrust rules also provide for special abuse rules for non-dominant companies with relative market power, and there are sector-specific excessive pricing rules for companies in the water and electricity sectors (Section 29 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC)).
- See South African Competition Commission, press release dated 1 June 2020, available at www.compcom.co.za.
- Case 27/76 United Brands, paras. 250 and 252.
- Case C-177/16 AKKA/LAA, ECLI:EU:C:2017:689, paras. 51 and 61.
- “Exploitative pricing in the time of COVID-19”, OECD (26 May 2020), p. 10.
- The following states do not have specific price gouging legislation, but have general consumer protection statutes that may apply: Alaska, Arizona, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming.
- The National Conference of State Legislature provides a list of statutory citations.
- MCLS section 445.903(1)(z); ORC Ann. 1345.03.
- See, e.g., NY CLS Gen Bus section 396-r; 10 M.R.S. section 1105; Fla. Stat. section 501.160.
- See, e.g., N.J. Stat. section 56:8-107.
- The lookback period used for price comparisons to determine price increases varies among the states. Some states compare to prices (i) immediately before the triggering event (e.g., La. R.S. section 29:732; Cal Pen Code section 396); (ii) 10 days before the triggering event (e.g., Virginia Post-Disaster Anti-Price Gouging Act, Va. Code Ann. section 59.1-525, et seq.) (iii) 30 days before the triggering event (e.g., Code of Ala. section 8-31-1, et seq.; Fla. Stat. section 501.160); or (iv) 60 days before the triggering event (e.g., N.C. Gen.Stat. section 75-38).
- See, e.g., Code of Ala. section 8-31-1, et seq.
- 10 per cent in New Jersey (N.J. Stat. section 56:8-108) and Oklahoma (15 Okl. St. section 777.1, et seq.); 15 per cent in Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. section 100.305; Wis. Adm. Code ATCP 106.01, et seq.), Maine (10 M.R.S. section 1105) and Oregon (ORS section 401.965); 20 per cent in Pennsylvania (Price Gouging Act, 73 P.S. section 232.1, et seq.); and 25 per cent in Kansas (K.S.A. section 50-6,106; K.S.A. section 50-627).
- See, e.g., Maryland (House Bill 1663 passed on 19 March, 2020).
- See, e.g., NY CLS Gen Bus section 396-r.
- See Iowa, 61 IAC 31.1; Iowa Code section 714.16.
- See, e.g., Alabama Unconscionable Pricing Act, Code of Ala. section 8-31-1, et seq.
- See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. section 75-38; N.C. Gen. Stat. section 75-1.1 (price gouging laws apply to “goods or services which are consumed or used as a direct result of an emergency or which are consumed or used to preserve, protect, or sustain life, health, safety, or economic well-being of persons or their property”).
- See, e.g., Fla. Stat. section 501.160.
- See, e.g., A.C.A. section 4-88-301, et seq. (price gouging laws apply to “any consumer food items or goods, goods or services used for emergency cleanup, emergency supplies, medical supplies, home heating oil, building materials, housing, transportation, freight, and storage services, or gasoline or other motor fuels”); Idaho Code section 48-603(19) (price gouging laws apply to “fuel or food, pharmaceuticals, or water for human consumption”); Cal Pen Code section 396 (price gouging laws apply to “any consumer food items or goods, goods or services used for emergency cleanup, emergency supplies, medical supplies, home heating oil, building materials, housing, transportation, freight, and storage services, or gasoline or other motor fuels”).
- See, e.g., C.R.S. 6-1-714.
- See, e.g., 14 Ill. Adm. Code 465.30; Burns Ind. Code Ann. section 4-6-9.1-1.
- See, e.g., Alabama Unconscionable Pricing Act, Code of Ala. section 8-31-1, et seq.
- See, e.g., HRS section 127A-30; HRS section 480-2.
- See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. section 42-230.
- O.C.G.A. section 10-1-393.4; O.C.G.A. section 10-1-438.
- See, e.g., Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, as last amended on 18 December 2019 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, UCPD). The UCPD, which is implemented and enforced at EU member state level, includes the following prohibitions: articles 5 and 6 of the UCPD prohibit traders from misleading consumers about various elements, including the availability of a product and the price, in conjunction with No. 7 and No. 18 Annex I of the UCPD. No. 7 Annex I of the UCPD prohibits, in all circumstances, stating that a product is only available for a very limited time, when this is not true, in order to trigger consumers’ immediate decision to purchase and thereby deprive them of sufficient opportunity or time to make an informed choice. No. 18 Annex I of the UCPD prohibits, in all circumstances, passing on inaccurate information about market conditions in relation to a product or the possibility of finding the product with the intention of charging the consumer higher than normal prices. In addition, articles 8 and 9 of the UCPD further prohibit aggressive commercial practices of a kind where traders exploit any specific circumstances of such gravity as to impair the consumer’s judgement, with a view to influencing their decision to purchase a product. For the UK, see also the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
- “Common Position of CPC Authorities: Stopping scams and tackling unfair business practices on online platforms in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak in the EU”, European Commission/Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network (20 March 2020), accessible via ec.europa.eu.
- New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas warned that “[i]ncreasing prices on necessities like medical supplies, hand sanitizer, masks, and other items because our citizens are in fear of the coronavirus is simply unconscionable, and anyone increasing prices in order to illegally profit from this emergency will be prosecuted.”
- Ryan Anderson, top aide to the Arizona attorney general, stated that the “Attorney General’s Office does not have authority to enforce price gouging protections under existing consumer protection laws. … There is no prohibition in existing statute that would prevent a business or an individual from engaging in price gouging tactics.”
- “Exploitative pricing in the time of COVID-19”, OECD (26 May 2020).
Client Alert 2020-414
